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“Citizenship in Western liberal democracies,” Joseph Carens once argued, “is the modern 
equivalent of feudal privilege–an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances.”1 
With this evocative blast of rhetoric, Carens sought to puncture the tightly guarded civic and 
territorial borders of liberal democratic states. Carens’s challenge was forceful because 
carried out in the name of the core values that liberal democratic states’ borders claim to 
contain and serve: freedom and equality. To say, as liberal egalitarians do, that all human 
beings are free and equal is implicitly to question all politically constituted boundaries that 
restrict freedom and entrench inequality via coercion. Liberal egalitarians have said this 
loudly when it has come to feudal boundaries, gender boundaries, racial boundaries, and 
even religious boundaries. So it is no surprise that they should say it about the boundaries of 
state and citizenship: if all humans are free and equal, then the use of coercion to deny the 
freedoms and privileges of citizenship to some but not others appears to be an egregious 
violation of liberal egalitarian principle.2 
 
To say this, of course, is merely to point to the tension between the widely accepted practices 
of self-styled liberal states and the open borders that liberal egalitarian moral commitments 
                                            
1 Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. 
Ronald Beiner (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995 [1987]), 229-253, p. 230. 
2 For liberal egalitarian critiques of closed borders, see also Joseph H. Carens, “Migration and 
Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective,” in Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational 
Migration of People and of Money, ed. Brian Barry and Robert E. Goodin (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 25-47; Phillip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal 
Political Theory and Immigration (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000); Howard F. Chang, 
“Immigration Policy, Liberal Principles, and the Republican Tradition,” Georgetown Law Journal 85. 
7 (1997): 2105-2119; and Peter Schuck, “The Transformation of Immigration Law,” Columbia Law 
Review 84.1 (1984): 1-90. 
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appear to require.3 My purpose here is to provide some preliminary reflections on one 
important set of responses to the liberal egalitarian critique of closed borders. These 
responses take the philosophical commitment to the equal moral worth of all for granted and, 
so, accept that under ideal circumstances liberal egalitarianism would mandate open borders. 
They claim, however, that as a matter of policy under today’s non-ideal circumstances, 
liberal egalitarian principles themselves permit or require the differential treatment of 
citizens and foreigners. More particularly, they claim that the long-term survival of liberal 
egalitarian institutions instrumentally requires curtailing open borders – at least 
provisionally. Even excluded foreigners, on this view, could not reasonably reject closed 
borders. 
 
I wish to suggest that, even under non-ideal circumstances, these arguments do not succeed 
in justifying a policy of closed borders. My purpose here is thus limited: I do not make a 
positive case for open borders. Rather, the thesis for which I would like to sketch a 
preliminary defence is that, even under today’s non-ideal circumstances, liberal 
egalitarianism mandates porous borders considerably more open than the current practice of 
self-styled liberal states. 
 
There are at least five arguments for why, in the actual world, border restrictions are 
justifiable as a means for serving liberal egalitarian values. First, as Carens points out, given 
the current levels of global economic inequality, if industrialized liberal democratic regimes 
were to open their borders, the sheer volume of the consequent levels of immigration could 
“overwhelm the capacity of the society to cope, leading to chaos and a breakdown of public 
order.”4 Second, given current global inequalities, rich industrialized countries with open 
borders could witness such a great number of poor immigrants that their economies would 
collapse.5 Third, open borders might precipitate letting in large numbers of immigrants who, 
regardless of their political values, are so culturally different from current citizens that their 
presence in large numbers would threaten liberal states’ capacity democratically to effect 
socio-political integration.6 Fourth, open borders might let in large numbers of immigrants 
who harboured subversive political intentions or who were fundamentally anti-liberal in 
outlook, and whose presence would threaten the survival of domestic liberal democratic 
institutions.7 Fifth, even if countries’ liberal democratic institutions and industrial economies 
survived, their capacity to sustain a welfare state of any sort might either collapse 
                                            
3 See Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion. 
4 “Migration and Morality,” p. 30; cf. “Aliens and Citizens,” p. 238, where Carens discusses this 
proviso in the context of ideal theory. 
5 John Isbister, “A Liberal Argument for Border Controls: Reply to Carens,” International Migration 
Review 34.2 (2000): 629-635, p. 630. 
6 This is Will Kymlicka’s argument, in “Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective,” 
Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, eds. David Miller and Sohail H. Hashmi 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001) 249-275. 
7 Carens, “Migration and Morality,” p. 28. 
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completely,8 or at least compromise the state’s capacity to fulfill putative special 
responsibilities to its own current citizens (or residents). 
Each of these arguments consists in an empirical premise – that open borders would lead to 
some outcome – plus a normative premise according to which, to the extent that the 
empirical premise is correct, border restrictions on entry are justified. I take it that, in the 
first four cases, a plausible justification for the normative premise could be provided to 
foreigners. A foreigner could not reasonably reject the normative premise of the public order 
argument since, as Carens argues, a “threat to public order” could justify curtailing free 
mobility on grounds that are compatible with respecting every individual as a free and equal 
moral person, because the breakdown of public order makes everyone worse off in terms of 
both liberty and welfare.9 
 
Similarly, the interest in free mobility does not seem so urgent as to outweigh the net global 
welfare losses entailed by the destruction of industrialized economies. The normative 
premise in the third case – which proceeds from the spectre of social disintegration – could 
be justified on the simple grounds that the long-term viability of liberal democracies 
internationally depends on relaxing, in the short-term, liberal egalitarian requirements about 
open borders. In the fourth case – where opening borders would destroy existing domestic 
liberal democratic institutions due to the intentions or character of immigrants – the 
normative premise could be justified as a temporary means for ensuring the survival of 
liberal democratic regimes. 
 
The real arena of controversy in the first four cases lies in the validity of each argument’s 
empirical premise, and the amount of openness that would bring about the undesired 
outcome. With respect to the first argument, for example, Carens argues (rightly, I believe) 
that the restrictions on entry required to maintain public order are much less than the 
restrictions currently in place. Similarly, I take it that all industrialized economies have the 
capacity to absorb, without collapse, a vastly greater number of immigrants than they 
currently allow.10 
 
In support of the third argument, one might argue, as Will Kymlicka does,11 that to be viable, 
liberal democracy requires cultural-nationalist policies of socio-political integration that 
ensure a minimum level of domestic cultural homogeneity, and that such homogeneity could 
only be secured via closed borders. There are two retorts to this. First, liberal democracy and 
social integration are not dependent on the existence of a single national public culture in any 
thick sense.12 Second, even if liberal democracy were dependent on some minimal level of 
cultural homogeneity, and even if this thinner level of homogeneity required state-sponsored 
                                            
8 Robert E. Goodin, “If People Were Money...,” in Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the 
Transnational Migration of People and of Money, ed. Brian Barry and Robert E. Goodin (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 6-22, p. 11. 
9 Carens, “Migration and Morality,” p. 30. 
10 See Howard F. Chang, “Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal 
Immigration Policy,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 145. 5 (1997): 1147-1244. 
11 “Territorial Boundaries.” 
12 See Arash Abizadeh, “Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four Arguments,” 
American Political Science Review 96.3 (2002): 495-509. 
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policies of integration, such policies are not dependent on closed borders, as demonstrated by 
open borders within regionally diverse federal states or within a union of states. Furthermore, 
if the high levels of immigration that would result from more open borders were a threat to 
integration, then one might expect the country, among industrialized liberal democracies, 
with the highest rates of per capita immigration – Canada – to fare worst in measures of 
integration. Ironically, in a different work Kymlicka himself provides a survey of the 
literature demonstrating that on all relevant indicators Canada fares extremely well and, 
indeed, better than other comparable countries in this regard.13 
 
With respect to immigrants with subversive political intentions, clearly the fourth argument’s 
empirical premise is not wholly false: there are those who would enter liberal democratic 
societies for the purpose of destroying them. But a regime of border control that could be 
justified to foreigners could not possibly lump all foreigners into a single undifferentiated 
category: the argument could justify restrictions only on the entry of those individuals who 
are actually (or reasonably suspected of) seeking to destroy the domestic institutions and 
would be able to do so unless denied entry. With respect to illiberal immigrants, the fear is 
that large numbers of them would overwhelm the capacity of the domestic liberal democratic 
culture to absorb the new entrants, and that the consequent destruction of a liberal 
democratic political culture would jeopardize liberal democratic political institutions as well. 
This is an old song and dance, and it obviously advances an empirical sociological claim 
beyond the scope of this review; I suspect that, like the cultural nationalist fears, these fears 
are also vastly exaggerated, and that insofar as they are grounded in sociological realities, 
they would once again only warrant restrictions much less than current levels.14 
 
The fifth argument holds that rich countries have a moral right (if not duty) to restrict entry 
because opening up their borders would have devastating effects for the provision of welfare 
to the domestically worst off.15 The argument comes in a welfare collapse and a welfare 
strain version. The welfare collapse version rests on the strong (and controversial16) 
empirical premise that industrialized liberal democratic countries’ domestic welfare regimes 
would collapse completely if they opened up their borders. Thus if freedom of movement is 
viewed (in Rawlsian terms) as “a socio-economic good of a sort that falls within the scope of 
the difference principle,”17 rather than as a basic liberty, and if open borders would destroy 
the very capacity to provide any welfare regime, then the harm from destroying a domestic 
welfare regime might outweigh the gains from freedom of mobility, since freedom would 
leave no welfare regime for anyone. More robustly, if opening borders would destroy 
                                            
13 Will Kymlicka, Finding our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), chapter 1. 
14 The relevant empirical literature for the Canadian case, which because it has the highest per capita 
rates of immigration amongst industrialized liberal democratic states represents the most difficult test-
case for my position, is once again gathered in Kymlicka, Finding our Way, chapter 1. 
15 James Woodward, “Commentary: Liberalism and Migration,” Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the 
Transnational Migration of People and of Money, ed. Brian Barry and Robert E. Goodin (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992) 59-84, pp. 69-74; Isbister, “Liberal Argument 
for Border Controls,” p. 633.  
16 See Chang, “Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade.” 
17 Woodward, “Commentary,” 62. 
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existing welfare regimes, then closing borders could be justified to foreigners on the grounds 
that the long-term prospects for global justice depend on the consolidation (not destruction) 
and gradual expansion of existing liberal democratic welfarist institutions (and, so, without 
any appeal to any special responsibilities to citizens per se). 
 
Saying that the just provision of welfare to all humanity in the long run depends on the 
consolidation and expansion of domestic welfare regimes whose survival may, in the short 
run, depend on restricting the scope of potential beneficiaries makes clear what this 
argument requires: the consolidation and global expansion of welfare regimes and their 
scope of beneficiaries. This is, at best, a conditional defence of closed borders: it is not only 
temporary, it is also conditional on being accompanied by policies that compensate for 
closure by contributing to the expansion of global welfare in the here and now. And once the 
extremely strong empirical premise is called into question – once it is acknowledged that 
current borders could be much more open without fear of welfare collapse – then the 
argument at most establishes a presumption in favour of porous and not closed borders – 
borders considerably more open than current levels. 
 
The welfare strain version of the argument rests on the more plausible empirical premise: 
that after a certain point, to the degree that borders are opened up further, the capacity of the 
state to provide welfare to its own citizens comes under strain. But to justify closing borders, 
this weaker empirical premise requires a stronger normative premise: it assumes that citizens 
have a special responsibility for the welfare of their own current fellow citizens (or 
residents), particularly the domestic poor, a responsibility that overrides any general 
responsibilities they might have for the welfare of all, including the global poor. 
 
This normative premise turns precisely on the objection that some liberals egalitarians have 
themselves raised against open borders. These critics argue that the requirement of giving 
equal consideration to the interests of all human beings – independent of relations of 
common citizenship or residence – fails adequately to account for the integrity of moral 
agents’ character and the significance of their relationships. They argue that there are special 
responsibilities we have to people that arise from the very fact of our relation to them. Such 
special responsibilities may be either associative duties that require us to give special 
consideration to the interests of our near and dear, or associative liberties that permit us to do 
so.18 This appeal to special responsibilities would challenge the critique of closed borders 
only if (a) there exist certain kinds of relationship that indeed do ground special 
responsibilities, (b) the relationships between the citizens (or residents) of a state are of this 
kind, and (c) the putative special responsibilities to fellow citizens (or residents) could only 
be fulfilled by closing borders. 
 
                                            
18 I follow Scheffler in designating associative duties as a class of special duties. Samuel Scheffler, 
Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 49. By associative liberty I mean the moral permission to give 
partial consideration to the interests of persons to whom we stand in a certain kind of relation. I use 
the term special responsibilities to refer to special duties and associative liberties together. 
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(a) For the sake of argument, I shall assume that some relationships ground special 
responsibilities. One might, following Robert Goodin, think that special duties are “devices 
whereby the moral community’s general duties get assigned to particular agents,”19 because 
such an assignment of special responsibility is the most efficient way to discharge general 
duties globally.20 Alternatively, one might, following Samuel Scheffler, think that some 
relationships have non-instrumental value, and that what it means for a relation to be valued 
non-instrumentally is for an agent to see the relation as an independent source of reasons for 
action, and hence of special responsibilities.21 Special responsibilities would then be 
compatible with the impartialist commitment to the equal moral worth of all if participating 
in relationships that are valued non-instrumentally is a necessary constituent of human well-
being (or even of moral agency as such).22 
 
(b) The question is whether the assignment of special responsibilities amongst citizens (or 
residents) of the same state could be justified instrumentally as the most efficient way to 
discharge general duties globally (Goodin) or, alternatively, justified from the non-
instrumental value of those relationships (Scheffler). 
 
In the context of non-ideal theory, the first, instrumentalist option is manifestly not viable, as 
Goodin himself notes. Since we are dealing here with the actual world, characterized by deep 
global inequalities, we cannot – as we might in ideal theory – say that the citizens and 
government of an industrialized country have a special responsibility to their own domestic 
poor: on the instrumentalist view, a special responsibility to care for the domestic poor is 
justified only if the general duty to provide care to all humans is most efficaciously fulfilled 
by assigning special responsibility over subsets of humanity to particular political 
jurisdictions. But under present conditions of deep global inequality, general duties to care 
for the basic welfare of all human beings are obviously not best discharged by assigning 
special responsibilities for the care of citizens of impoverished countries to their own fellow 
citizens and polity, who are equally impoverished. 
 
The second, non-instrumentalist option requires showing (1) that relations between citizens 
(or residents) do indeed have non-instrumental value and (2) that (insofar as liberal morality 
is committed to the equal moral worth of all) this value is not compromised by the 
relationships’ impact on outsiders. For example, if special responsibilities are justified 
insofar as some non-instrumentally valued relationships are vital constituents of a life with 
moral agency, then the question is whether relations of citizenship are necessary for moral 
                                            
19 Robert E. Goodin, “What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?,” Ethics 98.4 (1988): 663-
686, p. 678. 
20 This is what Goodin calls an “assigned responsibility model.” 
21 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, chapters 6-7. 
22 I extrapolate this point from Bernard Williams’ argument that an ongoing commitment to certain 
“ground projects” is necessary for moral agency as such. (Though Williams himself saw his argument 
as a critique of impartialist views of morality.) What needs to be added is the assumption that the 
ground projects necessary for agency must necessarily include non-instrumentally valued relationships 
with others. See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), chapter 1; and John Cottingham, “Partiality, Favouritism and 
Morality,” The Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 357-373. 
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agency in this way. (I take it that it is obvious that they are not.) Alternatively, if special 
responsibilities are further justified insofar as the non-instrumentally valued relations of 
which they are constitutive are themselves constituents of human well-being, the question is 
whether such relations of citizenship (or residency in the same state) are indeed vital 
constituents of human well-being. I do not propose a definite answer to this question. 
Instead, I wish to make two related observations. 
 
If one of the primary functions of the institution of citizenship and border control is to 
enforce oppressive relations of inequality in the world between members of rich and poor 
countries, then to that extent its putative non-instrumental value is non-existent – just as the 
“value” of family relationships whose purpose is to entrench oppressive and unequal gender 
is illusory. 
 
Similarly, even if current citizens (or residents) had prima facie special responsibilities to 
each other, the fact that liberal egalitarianism requires that they be justified with an eye to the 
impartialist standard of the equal moral worth of all means that any putative special 
responsibility is always open to what Scheffler calls the “distributive objection.”23 The 
distributive objection asserts that special responsibilities to favour the interests of insiders 
are unfair if they serve “to reinforce inequalities in the distribution of resources of other 
kinds.”24 Given contemporary levels of global inequality, this is clearly the case for relations 
of citizenship (or residence) as they are today. Scheffler does suggest one way in which the 
distributive objection could be overcome, but his suggestion does little to ground closed 
borders in the special responsibilities of citizenship: Scheffler suggests that putative special 
responsibilities “will remain open to challenge on distributive grounds unless those who are 
not members of the putatively duty-generating groups and relationships are given the 
opportunity to join and voluntarily decline to do so.”25 Special responsibilities could hold 
force only if borders were open. 
 
(c) Obviously, even if current citizens (or residents) had special responsibilities to each 
other, and were thus either required or permitted to favour the interests of their fellow 
citizens (or residents) via the institutions of the state, it would not follow that those interests 
either ought to be or rightly can be served by keeping outsiders out. An associative duty or 
liberty to close borders would exist only if (1) the fulfilment of genuine special 
responsibilities somehow requires closed borders and (2) the requirement to fulfill those 
special responsibilities through closed borders is not overridden by closure’s impact on 
general responsibilities to outsiders. The first condition obviously raises an empirical 
question whose answer depends on precisely what the putative special responsibilities of 
citizenship are. The second condition is the basis for the distributive objection. The objection 
arises because the control of borders constitutes an exercise of state coercion over outsiders 
and the exercise of coercion requires a justification consistent with the freedom and equality 
                                            
23 As Scheffler notes, “the distributive objection implicitly appeals to” the impartialist premise “that 
all persons have equal moral worth.” Boundaries and Allegiances, p. 75. 
24 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, p. 74. Framed in this way, the distributive objection is not 
an objection to special responsibilities as such, but to some class of special responsibilities. 
25 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, p. 74. 
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of all, including those persons whose options (movement) are coercively restricted. The use 
of state coercion against outsiders in order to fulfill special responsibilities to insiders must 
be justified on grounds that could not be reasonably rejected by outsiders qua free and equal 
persons. 
 
I take it that, given current levels of inequality, such a justification of borders, grounded in 
special responsibilities and capable of overcoming the distributive objection, is not 
forthcoming. And once we assume away current levels of inequality, then the entire 
motivation behind the special responsibilities argument is blocked at the outset. For if we 
assume an idealized world of liberal democratic polities and global justice, where the gross 
inequalities of the present order do not obtain, then the empirical premise that closing 
borders is necessary to discharge special responsibilities to the domestically worst off 
becomes wildly implausible. Even the welfare strain version of the argument is motivated by 
the spectre of the Earth’s desperately poor swamping industrialized states, a spectre that 
evaporates under idealized conditions. More to the point: if under idealized circumstances 
the state’s domestic poor would be better off given global labour mobility, then any special 
responsibilities that the state would owe them would actually best be discharged via a global 
open borders regime. Under actual non-ideal circumstances it is difficult to argue that special 
responsibilities to the domestic poor obtain; under idealized circumstances it is difficult to 
see how such special responsibilities, if they did obtain, would warrant closing borders. 
 
At most, the five arguments considered here justify porous borders that are considerably 
more open than the borders of today’s self-styled liberal states. 
